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Executive Summary
This paper describes three prototypical systems of therapeutic reference
pricing (RI') for pharmaceuticalsGermany, the Netherlands, and New
Zealandand examines their effects on the availability of new drugs, reim-
bursement levels, manufacturer prices, and out-of-pocket surcharges to
patients. RP for pharmaceuticals is not simply analogous to a defined contri-
bution approach to subsidizing insurance coverage. Although a major purpose
of RI' is to stimulate competition, theory suggests that the achievement of this
goal is im]ikely, and this is confirmed by the empirical evidence. Other effects
of RI' differ across countries in predictable ways, reflecting each country's sys-
tem design and other cost-control policies. New Zealand's RP system has
reduced reimbursement and limited the availability of new drugs, particularly
more expensive drugs. Compared to these three countries,if RP were applied
in the United States, it would likely have a more negative effect on prices of on-
patent products because of the more competitive U.S. generic market,and on
research and development (R&D) and the future supply of new drugs, because
of the much larger U.S. share of global pharmaceutical sales.
I.Introduction
Reference pricing (RP) is an approach to reimbursement for pharma-
ceuticals that is of considerable policy and research interest. Germany
first formally adopted reference pricing in 1989, followed by the
Netherlands in 1991 and New Zealand in 1993. British Columbia and
Australia adopted reference pricing for specific therapeutic classes in
1995 and 1996, respectively. In the United States, reference pricing has
been proposed as a possible approach to drug reimbursement for
a comprehensive Medicare drug benefit(Huskamp et al. 2000).
Reimbursement based on functional equivalence, which has been sug-
gested for reimbursement of drugs that are already reimbursed under2 Danzon and Ketcham
Medicare Part B, is essentially informal reference pricing. Japan has
also debated adopting reference pricing to reform its system of
pharmaceutical reimbursement.
Reference pricing is simple in concept: productsare classified into
clusters based on similar therapeutic effects. The payer setsa reference
price (RP) for each cluster based on a relatively low-priced product
for example, the minimum or median pricein the cluster. The RP is
the maximum reimbursement forall products in the group.
Manufacturers may charge a price above the R1 but in thatcase the
patient must pay the surcharge. If the manufacturer's price is less
than the RP, the savings may be shared between thepayer and the
dispensing pharmacist, depending on system design.
The rationale for RP is to stimulate competition by informingcon-
sumers and physicians about substitutability between products. For
example, de Vos (1996) explains the objectives of the Dutch reference
pricing system:
[C]onsiderable effort was expended by the Dutch government to stimulate
price competition in the pharmaceutical market.... Only when the necessary
information about a specific medicine in relation to its substitutes is readily
available can the demand side of the market, i.e., consumers, doctors, patients
and insurance companies, make decisions on the fairness of prices. In the
Netherlands, this objective was achieved by categorizing medicines into
groups of interchangeable drugs and making doctors and patients aware of
the interchangeability of medicines within such groups. (de Vos, 1996)
Because reference pricing controls the reimbursement but not theman-
ufacturer's price, this approach is usually viewed as less restrictive
than price controls and has been adopted in countries that previously
had free pricing. Reference pricing is also in some ways similar toa
defined contribution approach to insurance subsidization. The effects
could be quite different, however, when applied to pharmaceuticals,as
we discuss below.
In analyzing RP programs, it is critical to distinguish between
generic referencing, which applies only to generically equivalent prod-
ucts with the same active ingredient and formulation, and therapeutic
RP programs, which extend referencing to products with different
active ingredients. Generic referencing is a well-established practice in
the United States through maximum allowable charge (MAC)pro-
grams that are used by Medicaid and by some managed-care programs
to reimburse for multisource compounds, that is, off-patentcom-
pounds with at least one generic product. The payer typically defines
the MAC as the maximum reimbursement for all products witha givenReference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 3
molecule, formulation, and strength, based on the price of a relatively
cheap generic. A patient who wants the originator brand must pay any
excess of the brand price over the MAC. Thus, U.S. MAC programs are
reference pricing in all but name, and similar generic referencing sys-
tems have existed in the United Kingdom and some Canadian
provinces for many years. Such generic referencing is relatively non-
controversial. It conserves third-party funds without exposing patients
to significant risk because it applies substitution only between generi-
cally equivalent products that have demonstrated bioequivalence to
the originator product. Moreover, because generic referencing applies
only to off-patent products, it does not reduce effective patent life for
originator products and hence has minimal effect on incentives for
research and development (R&D). Since the 1990s, generic referencing
has been adopted by a growing number of countries, including
Sweden, Italy, Spain, and Denmark.
Therapeutic referencing, as developed by Germany, the Netherlands,
and New Zealand, extends the concept of substitutability from generi-
cally equivalent products (same molecule) to different molecules for
the same indication. Therapeutic referencing is far more controversial
because it treats compounds with different active ingredients as equiv-
alent, despite possible differences in efficacy and/or side effects for at
least some patients. Patients for whom the reference-priced product
does not work face either higher copayments or health risks if they
switch, which may be nonoptimal insurance coverage. Moreover,
by clustering on-patent compounds with off-patent compounds,
RP may reduce effective patent life and significantly affect incentives
for R&D.
A full analysis of reference pricing would address its effects on
patients, on manufacturers, and on the efficiency of resource use. These
issues are discussed below, but the empirical analysis is necessarily
more limited, as is the existing literature. Previous studies have
described the design of various countries' RP systems and reported
data on drug spending either in aggregate or for a limited number of
products in individual countries (see, for example, Danzon 2001,
Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy 2001, Jonsson 2001, and loarinides-
Demos et al. 2002). Few studies of reference pricing use micro data.
Studies of RP in Germany concluded that brand manufacturers gener-
ally dropped their prices to the reference price (Remit Consultants
1991, Maasen 1995, Darizon and Liu 1996). Similarly, Pavcnik (2002)
found that manufacturers of hypoglycemics and H2-antagonists
reduced their prices in response to the introduction of RP in Germany,4 Danzon and Ketcham
and that branded products were affected more than generics. In other
circumstances, however patients have faced significant surcharges and
have switched away from surcharged drugs. Following the implemen-
tation of RP in British Columbia, patients reduced their utilization of
higher-priced ACE inhibitors in favor of other antthypertensives with
lower out-of-pocket costs (Schneeweiss et al. 2002). Thomas, Mann,
and Williams (1998) report that in New Zealand, following a tender
for the hydroxyl-methylglutaryl coenzyme A (HMGCoA) reductase
inhibitor class, fluvastatin tendered the lowest price and established
the subsidy (RP) for the class. Patients receiving simvastatin faced a
surcharge of NZ$50.63 per month. Patients who switched to the fully
subsidized fluvastatin experienced a significant increase in total
cholesterol, LDL cholesterol, and triglyceride levels (p < 0.01).
Some of these results might suggest that RP succeeds in its objective
of encouraging competition. The evidence from Germany is not repre-
sentative of comprehensive RI? systems, however, because new on-
patent products were exempt from RP after 1996. Estimation of the
effects of RIP alone are confounded in all countries because other cost-
control measures were adopted. For example, in 1993, Germany intro-
duced a global drug budget with physicians at risk for spending
overruns, which strongly influenced physician prescribing (see Ulrich
and Wille 1996), and in 1996, the Netherlands superimposed strict price
controls on reference pricing. Because each country's RP system is dif-
ferent, generalization from single-country studies may be inappropri-
ate. None of these previous studies has compared the effects of RI?
across countries with different system designs, and none has examined
the effects of RIP on the availability of drugs.
In this paper we first describe the main features of the RP systems
in Germany, the Netherlands, and New Zealand and each country's
other cost-control policies that may confound estimation of the effects
of RP. Section III outlines a model of manufacturer response to reference
pricing and develops hypotheses about the effects of RP on price com-
petition and the availability of new drugs. Our empirical analysis
combines data on reference prices from government sources and data
on manufacturer prices from the market research firm IMS Health for
five major therapeutic categories in 1998.1 Section 1V describes the data.
Section V reports the evidence on the availability of new products and
the effects of competition and other factors on RPs, manufacturer
prices, and patient surcharges. Section VI summarizes these findings
from the three countries. Section VII compares RIP to other possibleReference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 5
models of insurance benefit design, in particular, a percentage co-
insurance rate and tiered formularies. Section VIII discusses the impli-
cations of these findings for the proposed use of RP in the United
States. The appendix summarizes differences among RP, price controls,
and tiered formularies.
We find that RP has significantly reduced the availability of new
compounds in New Zealand, which has the most aggressive RP sys-
tem, and this effect is greatest for high-priced new products. There is
no evidence that RP has encouraged competition, which is consistent
with the hypothesis that prices tend to converge to and remain at the
RP in the absence of other interventions.The findings that RP has
tended to reduce reimbursement for recently launched products and
that originator products are more likely to charge surcharges suggest
that RP may reduce manufacturer incentives for innovation.
The experience of RP in these three countries has lessons for the
United States and for other countries that may consider it. But we
conclude that if RP were adopted in the United States, for example,
for a Medicare drug benefit, it could have a much more negative
effect on prices of on-patent drugs and on incentives for R&D than
occurred in these three countries. The structure of retail pharmacy in
the United States results in a more price-competitive generic market,
which in turn would put greater pressure on on-patent drug prices
than occurs in other countries. Significant reductions in on-patent
revenues in the United States could have a significant effect on incen-
tives to develop new drugs given the dominant U.S. share of global
pharmaceutical sales. Thus, whereas the United States is less likely
than these smaller markets to experience nonlaunch of new drugs
that are already advanced in the pipeline, the long-term effects on the
supply of new drugs are likely to be more severe if RP is applied in
the United States.
Reference pricing as analyzed here, which sets a single reimbursement
price for different products that are considered interchangeable in a
given country, should not be confused with cross national referencing,
which is a form of price regulation used by many countries. Cross-
national referencing sets the price of each product to the mean or median
price of that same product in other countries. Such cross-national
referencing is not expected to encourage price competition between
therapeutic substitutes; rather, it constrains a manufacturer's ability
to price-discriminate across countries for a given product, and the
manufacturer's price cannot exceed the regulated price.6 Danzon and Ketcham
Reference pricing is also distinct from tiered formularies used by
pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) in the United States. In a tiered for-
mulary, products considered more cost-effective are placed on the pre-
ferred tier and carry a lower copayment than nonpreferred products on
the higher tier. For example, the copayment structure may be $5, $15,
and $30 for a generic, preferred brand, and nonpreferred brand, respec-
tively. The PBM negotiates discounts from drug manufacturers in
return for preferred formulary status and the implied increase in mar-
ket share. Thus, tiered formularies are used to promote price competi-
tion actively among therapeutic substitute drugs. However, PBMs
usually apply RP only to generically equivalent, multisource com-
pounds; that is, the preferred product in a molecule is a generic and
patients who want the higher-priced originator brand must pay the
excess of the brand price over the generic price. For therapeutic substi-
tutes, although lower-priced products are more likely to be preferred,
a product that is priced higher but is more effective may be on the pre-
ferred tier and reimbursed at a higher price than a less effective com-
pound on either the same or the nonpreferred tier. Thus, compared to
RJ, tiered formularies are designed to stimulate competition through
negotiated discounts in return for preferred formulary status, and
tiered formularies are more flexible in paying higher reimbursement
for products that offer better efficacy, fewer side effects, or in other
ways are more cost-effective. Implications of these differences between
RP and tiered formularies are discussed in Section VIII.
II.Reference Pricing in Germany, the Netherlands, and New
Zealand
Every RP system must define the rules for clustering drugs, including
classifying new products, and for setting reference prices. This section
describes the main features of each country's RP system through 1998,
the year of our data. Post-1998 changes are also mentioned when they
are relevant to understanding the evolution of these systems. We also
describe each country's other pharmaceutical cost-control policies that
potentially influence drug prices and volumes and hence must be
considered in interpreting results.2
Germany
Germany adopted reference pricing in 1989. The federal government
defined broad parameters but implementation was left largely to theReference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 7
Association of Sickness Funds (Bundesverband der Betriebskran-
kenkassen [BKK]). The BKK defined the clustering system for drugs,
subject to the approval of the physicians' association. The BKK also
determined the reference prices.3
Classification.Unlike the Netherlands and New Zealand, Ger-
many's RP system was phased in for different types of products
and was not intended to be fully comprehensive. Class 1 includes
products with the same active ingredient (generic referencing);
class 2 applies to therapeutically and pharmacologically similar
active ingredients; and class 3 applies to compounds with compara-
ble therapeutic effect, especially combinations. Litigation over the
definition of groups for classes 2 and 3 (particularly the cluster-
ing of newer, patented products with off-patent products) slowed
implementation.
New Products.Following legislation in 1996, new on-patent prod-
ucts have been exempt from RP and are reimbursed in full without
price controls. New generic products can join existing clusters with
reimbursement at the prevailing RE
As of January 2000, reference prices covered 197 active ingredients in
class 1, 166 active ingredients in twenty-three groups in class 2, and
thirty-one combinations in class 3. These drugs accounted for roughly
50.3 percent of expenditures and 64 percent of scripts under Germany's
statutory health system (VFA 2000).
Setting the Reference Price.Germany's method for setting RP lev-
els was designed to reflect market prices more closely than in other
countries. For each group, a standard formulation (for example, reg-
ular tablets of 20 mg strength) was selected and an RP was set for
that formulation within the range of manufacturer prices, with a
higher RP set for product classes with few generic suppliers to
encourage entry. The relative RPs for different formulations,
strengths, and pack sizes were based on a quasi-hedonic regression
(of Cobb-Douglas form) applied to manufacturer prices. RPs are
revised annually, based on a review of actual manufacturer prices. In
Germany, manufacturers have sometimes priced below the RP,
which leads to reductions in RP levels in classes where the prevail-
ing RP exceeded the average manufacturer price. As discussed
below, this tendency for manufacturers to price below the RP in8 Danzon and Ketcham
Germany probably reflects incentives created by the physician drug
budgets rather than the RP system.
Physician, Pharmacy, and Patient Incentives.Physicians who pre-
scribe a product priced above the RP are legally required to explain to
the patient why the surcharged product is necessary. This stipulation
creates an incentive for physicians to avoid products priced above the
RP. assuming that an explanation requires physician time that is
not reimbursed. Information on product prices is made available to
physicians.
Retail pharmacy in Germany is strictly regulated with respect to
pricing, margins and entry. German pharmacists have traditionally
lacked the authorization and the incentive to substitute low-priced
generics or parallel imports (PIs) for higher-priced originator products.
Until 2001, pharmacists were permitted to substitute a generic for a
brand only if the physician prescribed generically, which occurred in
only 5 percent of scripts (Schoffski 1996). German pharmacy dispens-
ing margins are regulated and yield a higher absolute margin on
higher-priced drugs, despite a declining percentage. To counteract
these perverse incentives, Germany enacted legislation in 2001 that
requires pharmacists to substitute a cheaper parallel import or generic
if either is available.
Other Cost Controls: Physician Drug Budgets.The adoption of RP
in 1989 did not stop the growth of drug spending. This outcome was
hardly surprising because Germany's RP system applied initially to
multisource products primarily. Of these, generics already accounted
for 53 percent of scripts (Ulrich and Wille 1996). Moreover RP does not
constrain volume or shifting to higher-priced products in other
groups.5 Faced with the cost pressures of reunification with the former
East Germany, in 1993 Germany increased patient copayments;
imposed a 5 percent price cut on non-RP drugs; and adopted a national
drug budget that set a limit on outpatient drug expenditures, initially
at the 1991 spending level and subsequently updated by the GDP
growth rate, with physicians collectively at risk for the first DM28Om
of any drug budget overrun (and the pharmaceutical industry at risk
for the next DM28Om). These measures led to a 19 percent decline in
pharmaceutical expenditures; a decline in the number of prescriptions;
and switching to cheaper products, including generics (Ulrich and
Wille 1996). Some regions implemented physician-specific prescribingReference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 9
protocols and drug budgets, based on medical specialty and patient
mix, but implementation was slow. The national drug budget was
abolished in 2002.
Summarizing, under the German RP system without the drug
budget, physicians, pharmacists, and patients did not have strong
financial incentives to prefer drugs priced below the RP; hence, manu-
facturers had little incentive to set prices below the RE6 To the extent
that dynamic price competition with pricing below the RP occurred in
Germany, this must be attributed to physicians being at risk for drug
budget overruns, not to reference pricing.
The Netherlands
In the 1980s, relatively high prices and rapid pharmaceutical spending
growth in the Netherlands made drugs a target for cost control, despite
relatively low drug spending compared to other European countries.
In 1991, a reference price system was introduced with the objective of
improving information, cost-consciousness, and price competition (de
Vos 1996).
Classification.Unlike Germany, the Dutch RP system was compre-
hensive from the outset; that is, it included almost all on-patent and off-
patent drugs. Clusters were defined based initially on five criteria,
which were reduced to four; then in 1999, they were reduced to the sin-
gle criterion of clinically relevant differences in effects that are decisive
for prescribing choices of doctors.7 Classification decisions are made by
the Ministry of Health, with input from a panel of medical advisers.
The clustering of new products has been frequently litigated, which
has led to some revisions of the clusters over time. For example, the
grouping of the new, more expensive migraine therapy sumatriptan in
the same category with two older ergotamine products was challenged
and settled only after a five-year lawsuit (Merck Frosst Canada 1996).
New Products.The Netherlands originally placed new, noncluster-
able products on a separate list, list lb, to be reimbursed in full.
Following rapid growth of spending on list lb products (over 20 per-
cent annually), list lb was closed in July 1993. New products could be
reimbursed only if they joined an existing cluster, unless they were
indicated for a disease for which no treatment existed. This stipulation
led to a growing list of "waiting-room" products that were not admit-
ted to outpatient reimbursement, even though they had marketing10 Danzon and Ketcham
approval and might be available to hospital inpatients. Some manu-
facturers accepted listing with existing groups as the only way to get
new products reimbursed; for example, the selective norepinephrine
reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs) were grouped with selective serotonin
reuptake inhibitors (SSIUs) and angiotensin-II antagonists with ACE
inhibitors.
Since 1997, a new product that is not clusterable may be reimbursed
if it is indicated for a disease for which no pharmacotherapeutic treat-
ment is available; if another treatment exists, the new drug may be
reimbursed only if it is cost-effective relative to the alternative and if
sufficient budget funds are available.
Setting the Reference Price.The Netherlands' approach to the prob-
lem of defining a common price for different compounds is to define a
standard daily dose for each compound, based on the World Health
Organization (WHO) defined daily dose (DDD) system. The average
price per DDD for each molecule is calculated as the unweighted aver-
age of the price per DDD of all originator and generic products in the
molecule. The RP is then set at the median of the distribution, across
molecules, of 1990 prices. These 1991 RPs remained in effect until 1999
apparently because this RI? system created no incentive for manufac-
turers to reduce list prices below the RI? and because list prices that
were initially below the RI? reportedly converged on the RI?. The
government therefore added direct price controls, as described below.
Pharmacy Reimbursement and Incentives. As in Germany, retail
pharmacy in the Netherlands is regulated with respect to entry and
pricing. Pharmacists are authorized to substitute a generic or a PT pro-
vided that the script is generically written and the patient is informed.8
Pharmacists receive a fixed dispensing fee per script, rather than a per-
centage of the product price, to encourage substitution toward cheaper
products. To encourage dispensing of generics and PIs further, the
pharmacist can retain one-third of the difference between the reim-
bursement price or RI? and the list price of the cheaper substitute.
However, pharmacists capture 100 percent of any manufacturer dis-
counts below the list price, whereas they receive only one-third of any
differential between the list price and the RE Manufacturers therefore
compete for market share by offering discounts off the list price rather
than by reducing the list price. The magnitude of these discounts was
estimated at NG300 to 400 million in 1994 (de Vos 1996). Thus, priceReference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 11
competition occurred in the Netherlands but not because of the RP sys-
tem. And it was not in a form that reduced list prices to generate
savings for payers. In July 1998, the government introduced a par-
tial "clawback" of the discounts through a 4.7 percent reduction in
reimbursement rates to pharmacies.
Other Cost Controls: Maximum Price Regulation.After a 5 percent
price cut in 1994, the Netherlands superimposed a new system (the
Maximum of Price Law) of maximum price regulation in 1996 to
reduce prices below levels generated by the RP system. The maximum
price for each molecule/dosage form/strength was hereafter based on
the average price in Belgium, France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom, including generics and originator products.9 This change
imposed a 15 percent price reduction on average and capped prices for
many products below their RP. Thus, in theNetherlands, the
Maximum Price Law made RPs nonbinding for many products and
introduced dispersion of prices of different compounds within an RP
cluster because of the variation in their maximum prices. In 1999, the
RP levels were reduced based on these regulated maximum prices.
Thus, although reference pricing in the Netherlands was intended to
promote price competition, in practice most list prices, including
generics, reportedly clustered close to the RP until the Maximum Price
Law invoked foreign price levels to force prices below the RPs.
Competition did thrive but in the form of discounts off list prices rather
than lower list prices, leading to profit for pharmacists, not savings for
the government, at least initially. This competition was driven by the
pharmacists' authorization and incentives to substitute generically
equivalent products, including parallel imports, and was quite
independent of therapeutic reference pricing.
New Zealand
New Zealand's outpatient pharmaceutical expenditures are managed
by the Pharmaceutical Management Agency (Pharmac), a not-for-profit
company owned by the Health Financing Authority.Pharmac's func-
tions are similar to those of competing pharmacy benefit managers
(PBMs) in the United States, except that Pharmac has monopsony
power. Pharmac defines the Pharmaceutical Schedule, a formulary or
positive list of roughly 3,000 prescription drugs and related products
that are eligible for subsidy (reimbursement); negotiates prices with
manufacturers and sets subsidy levels, if any; and designs and operates12 Danzon and Ketcham
other cost-control strategies. The Schedule lists the price of each drug,
the subsidy level, and the guidelines or conditions under which the
drug may be prescribed. Consumers may purchase other approved
drugs but without public subsidy. Pharmac is advised bya
Pharmacology and Therapeutics Advisory Committee (PTAC) com-
prised of medical specialists and general practitioners whose role is to
provide independent advice on the pharmacological and therapeutic
consequences of proposed amendments to the Pharmaceutical
Schedule, including review of company applications for Schedule list-
ing and requests by Pharmac for removing items from the reimburse-
ment list. Reference pricing was introduced in July 1993 with the intent
to "reduce the excessive market segmentation based on brand market-
ing, which previously allowed suppliers to establish markets that were
free from price competition" (Kletchko, Moore, and Jones 1995).
Classification.Almost all prescription drugs that are reimbursed in
New Zealand are subject to reference pricing. Therapeutic subgroups
are relatively broadly defined as "pharmaceuticals that produce the
same or similar therapeutic effects in treating the same or similar
conditions" (Kletcbko, Moore, and Jones 1995). Patent status is not
considered.
New Products. New products are generally reimbursed only if they
join an existing subgroup, which requires offering a price below the
prevailing RP (see below). A new product that is not clusterable intoan
existing subgroup may sometimes be reimbursed if Pharmac and the
manufacturer can agree on a reimbursement price. For example,
Serevent was listed after five years of negotiations; Imigran tablets
were submitted for review four times in five years (Merck Frosst
Canada 1996).
Setting the Reference Price. New Zealand sets the RP at the lowest
price in each subgroup, regardless of patent status. In principle, manu-
facturers may charge a price above the RP. However, Pharmac may
eliminate all subsidy for a product if a substitute product is available at
a lower price and if Pharmac considers that the higher-priced product
has no additional clinical benefit.
Unlike Germany and the Netherlands, Pharmac has used itsmonop-
sony power and the RP system to negotiate price cuts on new products,
which then apply to all existing products in the RP cluster. Specifically,Reference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 13
a new product is admitted to reimbursement in an existingRP cluster
only if it is priced significantly below the prevailing RP. For generics,
the first generic must offer a 30 percent price cut relative to the
brand, the second must offer an additional 20 percent cut, and so on,
although the required discounts for generics are becoming less rigid.
These lower prices then define the new, lower RP for all products in
that subgroup. Tendering is also used, with the lowest tendered price
becoming the subsidy level for all drugs in the group.
Alternatively, the manufacturer of a new product may also offer a
cross-therapeutic deal by reducing its price on another of its products
in another therapeutic subgroup. A manufacturer may rationally prefer
to give a large price cut on an old product with a small market share
rather than accept a low launch price on a new product that it hopes
will gain significant volume. Thus, Pharmac uses cross-therapeutic
deals to negotiate larger price cuts than manufacturers might be will-
ing to offer on new products. For example, in 1996, a 40 percent price
cut on Tagamet was offered in return for a listing on the Schedule for
Famvir, thereby reducing the RP of all H2 antagonists by 40 percent
(Pharma Pricing Review 1996). The Schedule is updated monthly.
Reference prices may thus change whenever a new product enters the
market or following a therapeutic group review initiated by Pharmac.
Physician, Patient, and Pharmacist Incentives.Physicians and
patients in New Zealand traditionally have had little incentive to be
price-conscious. The patient copayment is the lesser of the cost of the
drug or a fixed payment (which depends on welfare status) per script,
plus any surcharge over the RP if the manufacturer's price exceeds the
subsidy. Nonfinancial strategies to influence physician prescribing
include provision of information, limiting certain drugs to specialists
and/or specific conditions, and counterdetailing. Some physician asso-
ciations also provide voluntary guidelines to their members, monthly
charting of prescribing relative to the average, and similar services.
Retail pharmacy in New Zealand is heavily regulated. As in
Germany and the Netherlands, restrictions on entry, prohibitions on
nonpharmacist ownership and on branching, and other measures dis-
courage retail price competition on drugs. Pharmacists were paid a
fixed dispensing fee per script plus a percentage of the price. Although
generic substitution rules permit the pharmacist to substitute gener-
ics unless the physician explicitly prescribes the brand and writes "no
substitution," the traditional percentage margin reimbursement14 Danzon and Ketcham
undermined incentives to substitute cheaper products that would yield
a lower margin. In 1998, the government proposed replacing this fee
based on percentage-of-price with a fixed dispensing fee.
Other Cost-Control Policies.In addition to RP for controlling prices,
Pharmac uses other strategies to control drug volume and expendi-
tures. National guidelines limit the prescribing of expensive medicines
to certain conditions and/or to specialists. For example, Prozac was
initially restricted and then made subject to an annual budget cap. In
pay-to-play contracts, suppliers are paid a negotiated, up-front amount
to make a product available at a lower price. Tendering, sole supply,
and preferred supplier contracts are used to offer a supplier a larger
market share in return for a lower price. In price-volume contracts, the
price varies inversely with volume. Many generics are subject to such
contracts. In average daily dose contracts, the subsidy is tied to a spec-
ified average daily dose and the supplier must pay a rebate if this aver-
age dose is exceeded, thereby shifting the risk of increasing daily
dosage strength to the supplier. Listing of a new drug may also be
contingent on the manufacturer accepting risk sharing through a
capped annual budget with paybacks for overruns and possibly price
reductions on drugs already listed.
In summary, although New Zealand's RP system by itself does not
encourage competition, Pharmac has negotiated price cuts as a condi-
tion of admitting new products to reimbursement through the RP
system, in addition to several other bargaining strategies.
III.Modeling Effects of Reference Pricing
A complete analysis of the effects of reference pricing would con-
sider its effects on patients, including availability of drugs, out-of-
pocket payments, and health outcomes; effects on drug expenditures
and any increase in physician or hospital visits to deal with compli-
cations or prescription changes; and effects on manufacturers,
including prices and volumes of new drugs and hence incentives for
innovation.
10
In this paper, we analyze the effects of RP on product launch decisions
and hence the availability of new products and its effects on the reim-
bursement (RP level), manufacturer price, and implied patientsur-
charge, conditional on launch. Volume responses to surcharges and other
factors are described in Danzon and Ketcham (2004, forthcoming). OurReference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 15
data set provides six months of data on RP levels and drug sales in our
three countries in 1998. The great majority of products in our sample are
under RP-96 percent in the Netherlands, 92 percent in New Zealand,
and 62 percent in Germany, where on-patent products launched after
1996 and older products with few competitors were exempt from RP. The
a]most universal coverage of RP in the Netherlands and New Zealand,
and the fact that we have only six months of sales data, preclude the use
of formal difference-in-differences analysis to estimate the effects of RE
Our empirical analysis exploits the difference between drug cohorts by
year of launch and exploits the differences among the threecountries in
their RP systems and other cost-control strategies. The following section
outlines specific predictions.
Effects of RI' on the Launch of New Compounds
Even in the absence of RP, other factors may lead to differences among
the three countries in the launch of new compounds. If each country
were a separate pharmaceutical market (so thatmanufacturers could
pursue country-specific pricing policies), moreproducts would be
launched in markets with larger potential sales, assuming that any
product launch entails certain fixed administrative and regulatory
costs, independent of its potential sales. Thus, based on population size
alone, Germany is expected to attract the most new compounds,
followed by the Netherlands and then New Zealand.
In practice, although pharmaceutical price regulation remains a
national prerogative, price spillovers across markets are potentially sig-
nificant due to parallel trade and regulation based on foreign prices, so
that a low price charged in one country can undercut prices in poten-
tially higher-price markets. Parallel trade is authorized between mem-
ber states of the European Union (EU).11 Regulation based on foreign
prices occurs formally and informally in many countries. This potential
for cross-national price spillovers is expected to make manufacturers
less willing to launch new compounds in countries with low prices,
especially countries with small potential sales volume (for evidence,
see Danzon, Wang, and Wang 2002).
The reference price systems in our three countries are expected to
exacerbate their relative attractiveness as markets for new compounds
based solely on market size. Germany's RP system created negligible,
if any, disincentive to the launch of new compounds because Germany
defined clusters relatively narrowly and new patented products were
exempt from RP after 1996. New Zealand's RP system is expected to16 Darizon and Ketcham
have the most negative effect on the launch of new compounds,
particularly potentially high-priced compounds, because New Zealand
has the broadest criteria for defining product clusters and usually
requires the manufacturer of a new product to offer a price below the
established RP as a condition of being reimbursed in that cluster (or
give a price cut in another cluster). Although the Netherlands, like
New Zealand, required that most new products join an existing RP
cluster as a condition of reimbursement, the Dutch criteria for product
clusters were less broad than those in New Zealand, and RP levelswere
set relatively high (at the median of 1991 prices, which were reportedly
high relative to European average prices, with no revision until 1999).
After 1996, the Netherlands' prices were capped at the median of prices
in the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Belgium. Thus, it isan
empirical question whether the resulting prices were sufficiently low to
discourage the launch of new compounds.12 In 1998, the availability of
new compounds in the Netherlands is expected to be similar to that
observed in Germany, assuming that Dutch prices were constrained to
levels similar to those in Germany and the United Kingdom, and that
early delays in admitting new products to the Dutch RP system had
been resolved.
Effects of RP on Drug Prices
If each country were a separate market, a drug manufacturer's pricing
response to RP would depend on how RP and any other cost-control
policies affect the price elasticity of demand, which in turn dependson
the incentives of physicians; patients; and, if substitution is permitted,
pharmacists. Under RP, patient demand is expected to be elastic at
prices above the RP unless patients are informed about any differential
product characteristics. Physician demand is also expected to be rela-
tively elastic at prices above the RE both as good agents for patients
and because physicians may incur an unreimbursed time cost if they
prescribe a drug that is priced above the RP. Physician drug budgets
are expected to increase physician price sensitivity, including sensitiv-
ity to prices below the RP. Pharmacists are expected to be highly price
sensitive if they can profit from the margin between the RI? reimburse-
ment and their actual acquisition cost of a generic substitute or parallel
import. However, the effects of RP in a specific country may be miti-
gated by concern for cross-market spillover effects to prices in other
countries. We discuss how these considerations apply in each of our
three countries.Reference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 17
In Germany, because RP applies only to therapeutic categories with
multiple close substitute products, a monopolistic competition model
is appropriate.13 Assuming monopolistic competition, the manufac-
turer's demand curve becomes kinked at the RE At prices above the
RP, demand is relatively elastic because patients must pay for any sur-
charge and physicians face a time cost of explaining to patients if they
prescribe a surcharged product. The kinked demand model predicts
that manufacturers of originator and other relatively high-priced prod-
ucts would drop their prices to the RP unless this within-country elas-
ticity effect is mitigated by potential revenue loss through cross-market
spilloversfor example, if reducing the price in Germany would result
in lower prices in other countries, say, Italy or the Netherlands, which
both cross-reference Germany in setting their own prices.'4
Germany's RP system alone created no incentives for physicians,
patients, or pharmacists to be price-sensitive at prices below the RP;
hence, the RP system created no incentives for dynamic competition to
reduce prices over time. Because Germany's physicians were finan-
cially at risk for drug budget overruns, however, their general price
sensitivity due to drug budgets could in theory create incentives for
manufacturers to charge prices below the RE Such competitive pres-
sure on prices is expected to be greater in classes with multiple generic
substitutes (same compound and hence, almost perfect substitutes)
than from therapeutic substitutes (different compounds and hence,
imperfect substitutes). Thus, in Germany, prices are predicted to be
inversely related to the number of competitors, particularly generic
competitors, in a class. Because Germany revised the RP levels period-
ically based on actual manufacturer prices, RP levels are also predicted
to be inversely related to the number of competitor products in a class.
But note that, aside from the initial incentive for high-priced products
to drop their price to the RP, these dynamic competitive effects in
Germany result from the physician drug budgets, not from the
structure of the RP system.
In the Netherlands, predicting the effects of the RI? system is compli-
cated by the maximum price ceilings. Under the RI? system alone, the
kinked demand model predicts that in classes with multiple competing
products, prices would converge to the RI?, except that surcharges may
survive for originator products if concerns about external price
spillovers dominate market share concerns in the Netherlands.
Manufacturers had no incentive to cut list prices below the RP because
neither physicians nor patients had incentives to be price-sensitive18 Danzon and Ketcham
below the RP and pharmacists were more price-sensitive to discounts
off the list price than to reductions in list prices. Moreover dis-
counts would not trigger price spillovers to other countries. (Note that
discounts off list prices are unobservable in our data, which include
only list prices.) For product classes with few competitors, oligopoly
may be a more appropriate assumption; although many models are
possible, aggressive price competition is unlikely. Thus, under assump-
tions of either monopolistic competition or oligopoly, RP alone would
not induce competition.
The Netherlands' experience with RP was dominated, however, by
the 1996 Maximum Price Law, which imposed binding, molecule-
specific price ceilings that were frequently below the RI? for each com-
pound. There was no incentive for manufacturers to set list prices
below these price ceilings. Thus, in the Netherlands, neither prices
nor RPs are expected to be influenced by competition induced by the
RI? system. The 1998 RPs reflect the price distribution that prevailed
in 1991, when the RP system was enacted. The 1998 prices reflect the
regulated price caps based on foreign prices, which may imply some
price dispersion depending on prices in the benchmark countries.
Consequently, prices in the Netherlands are expected to vary
inversely with the number of competitors to the extent that such con-
ditions prevailed in the benchmark foreign countries (United
Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, and France). In fact, market and regu-
latory systems in all these countries would plausibly lead to an
inverse relation between prices and the number of competitor prod-
ucts (see Danzon and Chao 2000); in which case, prices in the
Netherlands should vary inversely with the number of competitor
products. However, this would reflect foreign experience and
assumes correlation across countries in the number of competitors by
therapeutic class.
In New Zealand, the kinked demand model predicts that manufac-
turer prices would converge down to the RI?, in the absence of manu-
facturer concerns about cross-market spillovers and assuming elastic
demand at prices above the RE Although neither physicians, patients
pharmacists have incentives to be price-sensitive at prices below the
RP. RI? levels and prices are nevertheless predicted to be inversely
related to the number of competitors in a class because Pharmac uses
its monopsony power to negotiate a reduction in the RI? as a condition
of permitting a new product to join an existing class.Reference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 19
In summary, the structural differences among the three countries' RP
systems, together with differences in other controls, lead to the specific
predictions discussed in the subsections below.
Availability of New Compounds. The probability of the launch of
new compounds is expected to be greatest in Germany and least in
New Zealand, particularly for new compounds launched after 1993
and for relatively high-priced products.
Price Compression.Reference pricing is expected to compress the
range of reimbursement levels (subsidies) and manufacturer prices
within each therapeutic class, with greater compression in countries
with broad criteria for defining classes and where the RP is basedon
the minimum manufacturer price in the class. Greatest downward
compression of RP levels is therefore expected in New Zealand, which
has the broadest criteria for defining clusters and sets the RP at the
lowest manufacturer price in each cluster. Germany's RP system is
expected to impose the least compression on both RPs and manufac-
turer prices; however, Germany's physician drug budgets create addi-
tional incentives for manufacturers to constrain relatively high prices
and even price below the RP, which confounds the predictions based
on RP alone. The Dutch RP system alone created incentives for conver-
gence of list prices to the RP, but the 1996 Maximum Price Law capped
many prices below their RPs and led to the dispersion of prices below
the RE Thus, for the Netherlands, price dispersion within classes is
possible due to price regulation, not to competition induced by the RP
system.15
Originators Versus Generics.Reference pricing is expected to reduce
RP (subsidy) levels and manufacturers' prices of originator products
relative to subsidies and prices of parallel imports and generic substi-
tutes because RP levels are generally based on relatively low-priced
products in each class without regard to patent status. Prices of origi-
nators may still be higher, but the difference is expected to be smaller
under RP than under free pricing. Unfortunately, none of our countries
provides a benchmark for completely unregulated pricing. For some
analysis, we use Germany as a benchmark of relatively free pricing of
new products because it exempted new patented products from its RP
system after 1996.20 Danzon and Ketcham
Price Competition.Although RP was intended to stimulate competi-
tion, this effect is limited to an incentive for high-priced products
(usually originators) in crowded categories to drop prices to the RP.
There is no incentive for manufacturers to price below the RIP and
indeed, if RPs were set above the lowest price, these prices may con-
verge upward. Thus, RIP alone creates no incentivefor dynamic price
competition in the absence of other controls or structural features that
make physicians, patients, or pharmacists sensitive to prices below the
RE In Germany, however, drug budgets created incentives for manu-
facturers to compete on price, and in New Zealand, Pharmac used its
monopsony power to bargain for a price reduction as acondition of
admitting new products to reimbursement in an established class.
Thus, in both Germany and New Zealand, prices and RIPs are predicted
to vary inversely with the number of competitors. For the Netherlands,
any apparent influence of the number of competitors on RPsreflects
competitive pressures as of1991,before the introduction of the RP sys-
tem; for prices, any influence of the number of competitors reflects
competition or regulation in the benchmark countries from which the
price caps were imported.
Surcharges.The kinked demand model predicts that demand
would be highly elastic at prices above the RP and that manufactur-
ers would drop prices to the RP (zero surcharge)if products in a class
are good substitutes or if patients are unaware of anydifferences in
efficacy or side effects possibly because physicians do not take the
time to explain. Thus, surcharges are expected only for products
with relatively inelastic demand because of actual or perceived supe-
rior characteristics, or if cross-national spillovers risks are signifi-
cant. Both effects are more likely for originator products than for
generics.
IV.Data
The data for this study include, for each country, all products with
sales reported by IMS in the first half of1998,for five major therapeu-
tic categories: anti-ulcerants (A02); hypoglycemics (AlO); antihyper-
lipidemics (ClO); antidepressants (N06); and antihypertensives, which
are further subdivided by mode of action into cardiactherapy (COl),
diuretics (CO3), beta blockers (C07), calcium channel blockers(C08),
and ACE inhibitors and angiotensin-Il antagonists(C09).16WeReference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 21
obtained sales data from IMS and RP (subsidy) data from theagency
responsible for reimbursement in each country.
We use the IMS data to calculate price per dose (IMS standard unit)
at manufacturer prices in U.s. dollars.17 The data from these two
sources were matched at the pack level to permit comparisons of prices
to subsidy levels. A surcharge per standard unit for each pack was
defined as the price minus the subsidy per standard unit. Extreme val-
ues of this surcharge were used to remove outlier packs. Molecule-level
prices, RPs, and surcharges are defined as volume-weighted averages
of the corresponding pack-level variables for each country.
We define two measures of age for each molecule. Country-specific
age is measured in months from the first launch date of any product in
the molecule in a given country to the latest date of the observation
period (June 1998). Global molecule age is the maximum of the three
country-specific age variables. These age measures apply to all prod-
ucts in a given molecule. Other measures of product value and market
competition are defined below. Measures of molecule age and the num-
ber of generic and therapeutic competitors were calculated before the
removal of outlier packs.
V.Empirical Results
Availability of New Compounds
Of the 200 molecules in our sample, Germany has 175, of which 109 (62
percent) are reference-priced; the Netherlands has 118, of which 108
(92 percent) are reference-priced; and New Zealand has 95, of which
91(96 percent) are reference-priced. The much larger number of mole-
cules available in Germany is consistent with expectations given
Germany's larger market size and its relatively narrow criteria for defin-
ing RP clusters, flexibility in setting RP levels, and exemption from RP
of on-patent products launched after 1996. Similarly, New Zealand's rel-
atively small number of launches is consistent with predictions given its
small population and its comprehensive RP system, with relatively
broad clusters and requirements for price cuts from new entrants.
Table 1.1 lists the availability of molecules categorized by their global
molecule age (first launch date in our three countries) to test whether
New Zealand and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands experienced
reduced availability after 1991, compared to Germany, because of their
more restrictive RP systems. This rough difference-in-differences
analysis uses Germany as the control group because Germany's RP22 Danzon and Ketcham
Table 1.1
Availability of molecules, as of 1998 by molecule global launch date
was least restrictive and new on-patent compounds were exemptafter
1996. More recent drug cohorts are expected to be less widely available
in all three countries because of lags in diffusion.
For Germany, the percentage of molecules available does not show a
strong trend after the introduction of reference pricing in 1989 com-
pared to the pre-RP period, with roughly 90 percent of compounds
launched. After 1994, this declines to 68 percent of the post-1994
cohort launched, which may reflect diffusion lags with censored data.
The Netherlands has fewer molecules launched after the introduction
of reference pricing in 1991 (59 to 60 percent) compared to 78 percent
in 1987 to 1990 immediately prior to RP. This finding suggests that the
Netherlands' requirement that most new products join established RP
clusters as a condition of reimbursement deterred the launch of some
new compounds. This conclusion is tentative becausethe Netherlands
also has relatively few (55 percent) of the pre-1987 cohort. RP may have
led to early withdrawal of some older molecules in the Netherlands
because of relatively low reimbursement (see figure 1.1), so our data
would underestimate the total number of older (pre-1987) molecules
launched. Withdrawing cheap old products that might reduce the
RP for new products could be a rational strategy for manufacturers,
particularly in classes with few competitors.
For New Zealand, there is a dramatic decline in availability for more
recent molecule cohorts. Whereas New Zealand has 53 percent of mol-
ecules launched before 1987, it has 45 percent of molecules launched
from 1991 to 1994 and only 12 percent of molecules launched from 1995
to 1998. This very low availability of the 1990s cohort of new molecules
in New Zealand cannot simply be attributed to its generally longer
launch lags.18 The sharply reduced availability of new compounds
Global launch Total Germany The Netherlands New Zealand
Prior to 1987 126 114 69 67
90% 55% 53%
1987-1990 27 24 21 15
89% 78% 56%
1991-1994 22 20 13 10
91% 59% 45%















































































































































































































































































































































124 Danzon and Ketcham
in New Zealand after 1994 is consistent with predictions, given its
requirement that new drugs accept reference pricing and give a price
cut relative to the prevailing RP. which was already the lowest priceof
established products in the class.
As an additional measure of availability of new molecules, table 1.2
lists the availability and mean launch lag of the forty-three new med-
ical entities (NMEs) launched in the United States between 1991 and
1998, where launch lag is measured relative to a compound's first
launch in any of these three countries or the United States.19 Because
Germany exempted new patented products from RP after 1996, we
divide the sample into molecules launched before and after that date.
For all three countries, the availability of these NMEs is less for NMEs
launched post-1996 compared to the 1991-1995 period, which may
partly reflect lags in diffusion combined with right-censored data. For
New Zealand, however, there is a dramatic drop, from 50 percent of the
pre-1996 molecules to 13 percent of the post-1996 molecules launched.
The declines are less dramatic in Germany (from 93 percent to 73 per-
cent) and the Netherlands (from 82 percent to 62 percent). The mean
and median launch lags for introduction of these NMEs are lowest for
Germany and highest for New Zealand. Thus, even for the limited sub-
set of molecules that are introduced, launch lags are longer inthe
Netherlands and longest in New Zealand compared to Germany.
To test whether this reduced availability of drugs in New Zealand
and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands might be related to low RPs in
these countries, figure 1.1 shows the median ratios of RPs and prices in
the Netherlands and New Zealand, respectively, relative to Germany.
Table 1.2
Availability and launch lag (months) of new medical entities (NME) launched in the
United States 1991-1998, as of 1998
'Lag defined as the number of months after earliest of FDA date, launch in Germany, NL,
or NZ.
Total Germany The Netherlands New Zealand
Availability
NME 1991-1995 28 26 23 14
93% 82% 50%
NME 1996-1998 15 11 10 2
73% 67% 13%
Lag of available Mean 5.8 6.8 19
moleculesa Median 0 1 12
n 37 33 16Reference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 25
Molecules are categorized by Country-specific launch date rather than
Global launch date to reflect country-specific regulatory regimes. The
sample of molecules is restricted to those available in both Germany
and the comparison country.2° Median rather than mean valuesare
reported because means are very sensitive to outlier values. For the
Netherlands relative to Germany, the median RP ratio increases from
.75 for compounds launched before 1987 to 1.12 for compounds
launched after 1994; the Netherlands/Germany price ratios follow a
similar upward trend. Thus, for compounds launched under reference
pricing, Dutch RPs and manufacturer prices are typically 7 to 12 per-
cent higher than German prices as of 1998. For the post-1994 molecule
cohort, the Dutch price ratios are lower than the RP ratios, whichmay
reflect the constraints imposed by the Dutch Maximum Price Law,
which capped prices for most molecules below their respective RPs
and hence made the RPs nonbinding. In general, the finding of lower
prices and RPs in Germany than the Netherlands for molecules
launched after 1990 may reflect the stronger incentives for dynamic
price competition in Germany due to the physician drug budgets. By
increasing physicians' price sensitivity, these budgets created incen-
tives for manufacturers to price below the initial RP levels, which
permitted consequent downward revisions of RPs in Germany.
For New Zealand, by contrast, median RP ratios are over 40 percent
lower than those in Germany, for three of the four time periods,
whereas median prices range from 53 percent lower to 3 percent higher
than those in Germany, with the lowest prices and RPs for the oldest
cohort. Thus, in general, RIPs and manufacturer prices are much lower
in New Zealand than in Germany or the Netherlands, as expected
given Pharmac's use of bargaining to negotiate cuts in prices and RPs
as a condition for the entry of new products. The surprising exception
is that post-1994 molecules are priced 3 percent higher on average in
New Zealand than in Germany, although RIPs are 35 percent lower. A
plausible explanation is biased selection; that is, these newest mole-
cules were launched in New Zealand only if they could charge a price
comparable to European levels. This interpretation is consistent with
the small number of post-1994 molecules launched in New Zealand
compared to earlier cohorts, as shown in table 1.2.21
To test whether aggressive RP systems are biased disproportionately
against relatively expensive drugs, figure 1.2 reports price and RP
ratios for the Netherlands and New Zealand relative to Germany, with












































































































































































































































































































9Reference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 27
Germany. We use Germany as the benchmark because it has the most
molecules and because its price distribution is expected to reflect
potential free market prices more closely. For the Netherlands, the
median RPs are ito 3 percent higher than the German RPs for products
in the lower and upper halves of the price distribution. For prices, the
Netherlands' median price relatives are lower for molecules that are
low-priced in Germany than for higher-priced molecules (0.94 versus
1.01). This finding suggests that the Dutch Maximum Price regulations
were more binding for lower-priced molecules, possibly because
generics are included in calculating the price ceiling. The Netherlands
also has a higher percentage of the higher-price molecules: 71 percent
of the high-price molecules compared to 57 percent of less-expensive
molecules. This situation may reflect the greater incentives to launch
higher-priced products due to relatively high reimbursement and/or
early withdrawal of products with relatively low reimbursement.
In New Zealand, by contrast, RP levels are disproportionately lower
for more expensive drugs than they are for less expensive drugs, and
with greater compression of RPs for high-price rather than low-price
drugs (0.49 versus 0.72) than for prices (0.72 versus 0.81). This suggests
that manufacturers charge higher surcharges on more expensive prod-
ucts to partly make up for lower RPs. However, the bias against expen-
sive products is also reflected in availability, with only 44 percent of the
more expensive drugs available in New Zealand compared to 51
percent of the less expensive drugs.
In summary, Dutch RPs and prices were typically at or above
German price and RP levels (except for the oldest cohort, which has
prices and RIPs below those in Germany). The smaller differential for
prices reflects the Netherlands' regulated price ceilings based on for-
eign referencing that imposed stricter controls than did the ineffectual
RP system (until the RPs were cut in 1999). Thus, the Dutch RIP system
failed to reduce manufacturer prices until additional, externally regu-
lated controls were added in 1996. The relatively low price levels in
Germany, together with other evidence of dynamic downward revi-
sions of prices and RPs in Germany over time, were largely due to the
global drug budget that placed physicians at risk for overruns, whereas
the RP system created no incentives for manufacturers to set prices
below the initial RIP levels.
In New Zealand, Pharmac's requirement that new products offer a
price below the prevailing RP as a condition of admission to reim-
bursement, thereby reducing the RP for existing products, succeeded in28 Danzon and Ketcham
reducing RP levels to 51 percent of German levels for drugs launched
from 1991 to 1994. It appears to be less effective for the post-1994 cohort
of new drugs, but this may reflect selection bias: only 13 percent of the
post-1996 cohort of new drugs was launched in New Zealand during
our observation period, and presumably those that were launched did
so because they were able to obtain a relatively high price. Moreover,
in New Zealand relative prices are always higher than the relative RPs
compared to Germany, and these differentials are greater for expensive
products. Overall, these results confirm that New Zealand's RP system
has set relatively low reimbursement levels, particularly for the newest
drugs and the most expensive drugs. Many of these drugs are simply
not available in New Zealand and for those that are available, patients
on average face out-of-pocket surcharges.
Compression of Reimbursement Within Drug Classes
An important issue in defining RP systems is the degree of consensus
about the substitutability of different drugs. A finding of consistency
across countries in classification and relative RP levels for different
drugs suggests broad clinical agreement about the relative merits of
different molecules, even though the formal criteria differ across coun-
tries and absolute RIP levels may differ. On the other hand, if the clas-
sification systems and relative RPs differ significantly across countries,
this suggests either significant clinical disagreement in defining clus-
ters or that budgetary concerns in practice override clinical judgment.
Given the broader criteria for defining classes in New Zealand, we pre-
dict greater compression of RPs across drugs within a therapeutic
category in New Zealand.
Although our data do not permit us to compare classification sys-
tems, we can compare the compression of reimbursement across mole-
cules within each broad therapeutic category. The compression of RPs
provides a bottom-line measure of the effect of the classification struc-
ture because a separate subgroup for improved products in a thera-
peutic category is relevant only to the extent that the RIP for this
subgroup differs from the RIP for inferior products. Table 1.3 reports
several measures of the compression of RIPs across molecules within
each therapeutic category (the sample is restricted to molecules that are
available in all three countries).
The results are generally consistent with expectations. In most coun-
try-class cells, there is a considerable range in RIPs. New Zealand has
the lowest median and maximum RIPs for eight of the nine therapeuticReference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 29
Table 1.3
Measures of reimbursement dispersion within ATC2s based on molecule average, 1998
dataa
aSample restricted to molecules with data available in all three countries.
Note: Shading indicates the lowest value for each cell across the three countries.
Mini- Maxi-Max/ Max -
(Max -
mm)! Standard
ATC2 N mum Medianmummiii miii mediandeviation
Germany
A2 22 0.04 0.21 1.62 39.66 1.58 7.61 0.45
A10 13 0.03 0.10 0.56 16.56 0.53 5.42 0.14
Cl 5 0.07 0.23 0.70 9.63 0.63 2.79 0.24
C3 26 0.04 0.12 0.61 16.83 0.58 4.79 0.12
C7 21 0.07 0.26 0.52 739 045 175 014
C8 14 0.11 0.33 0.73 649 061 188 0.18
C9 17 0.20 0.36 0.76 375 055 1 56 016
dO 20 0.07 0.39 0.89 1276 082 209 023
N6 34 0.04 0.28 1.37 3264 1 32 470 040
Median: 0.07 0.26 0.73 12.76 0.61 2.79 0.18
The Netherlands
A2 14 0.07 0.70 1.72 24.92 1.65 2.34 0.56
AlO 7 0.05 0.11 0.48 9.97 0.43 3.78 0.15
Cl 3 0.07 0.09 0.32 473 0.25 2.93 0.14
C3 11 0.06 0.09 0.21 373 0.15 1.65 0.06
C7 17 0.07 0.22 0.59 8.53 0.52 2.39 0.13
C8 12 0.14 0.39 0.98 6.82 0.83 2.12 0.24
C9 14 0.24 0.55 0.88 3.72 0.64 1.17 0.18
dO 11 0.05 0.44 1.34 28.00 1.29 2.92 0.43
N6 22 0.04 0.21 1.32 35.53 1.28 6.08 0.43
Median: 0.07 0.22 0.88 8.53 0.64 2.39 0.18
New Zealand
A2 13 000 016 083 54760 082 501 027
AlO 5 004 008 009 232 005 064 002
Cl 3 002 003 014 669 012 418 007
C3 10 001 003 012 1228 011 343 004
C7 12 001 005 028 2652 027 556 009
C8 7 018 036 071 387 053 148 019
C9 9 010 017 0.71 717 061 363 019
dO 11 000 031 093 930617 093 304 027
N6 20 003 019 1.04 3412 101 524 029
Median: 0.02 0.16 0.71 12.28 0.53 3.63 0.1930 Danzon and Ketcham
categories, and the lowest range and standard deviation for seven and
six categories, respectively. The normalized range, defined as (maxi-
mum - minimum)/median, is lowest in New Zealand for only two of
the nine categories, presumably because the low median offsets the
high range. This is additional evidence that New Zealand's approach
(using broad criteria for defining clusters and setting the RP at the low-
est price in each class) has resulted in greater compression of RPs
across molecules in a therapeutic category than has the less restrictive
criteria used in the Netherlands and Germany. We estimated similar
distributions using the product and the pack as the unit of analysis.
Results were very similar to the molecule-level distributions reported
in table 1.3.
RPs, Prices, and Generic Competition
RP is often rationalized as a mechanism to stimulate competition (see,
for example, Kletchko, Moore, and Jones 1995) because the payer pays
the same price for all products in a cluster. The monopolistic competi-
tion model implies that firms that previously priced above the RP
would likely reduce their prices to the RP, while firms that previously
priced below the RP may increase their prices, leading to a convergence
of prices on the RE Dynamic downward pressure on prices is not
expected except where other programs create incentives or constraints
for pricing below the RP, such as Germany's physician drug budgets or
New Zealand's requirement for price cuts from new entrants. Thus, the
prediction is that, under RP, prices would be inversely related to the
number of competitors in Germany and New Zealand but not in
the Netherlands unless this effect was "imported" from pre-RP prices
(which were the basis of the initial RP levels) or from foreign prices
through the maximum price ceilings. Because our database is a half-
year cross-section of prices, we cannot measure price changes in
response to RE Nevertheless, these 1998 data do reflect several years of
experience under RP for all three countries.
Our multivariate analysis estimates reduced-form, quasi-hedonic
equations for RP, price, and surcharge per unit for all products in our
sample in each country. Standard hedonic price equations estimate the
relationship between prices and product characteristics or cost factors
that influence demand or marginal cost. Our regressions are quasi-
hedonic because the perfect competition assumption of standard
hedonic theory does not apply to pharmaceutical markets, which are
imperfectly competitive and subject to regulation. Our equationsReference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 31
therefore include measures of competition and indicators of regulatory
regime in addition to product characteristics.
The quasi-hedonic estimating equation for the price of product i in
molecule] in therapeutic classkcan be written as follows:
=+a3Zj+a2Nr+a3Ntk + a4R1 (1.1)
where Z]k is a vector of product quality dimensions and other character-
istics that are expected to influence demand, a2 reflects the effect of the
number of generic competitorsin molecule], and a3 reflects the effect
of the number of therapeutic substitutes (other compounds) in classk
(Ntk).We predict a2, a3 <0, and Ia2 I> Ia3 Iif generic competition
exerts greater downward pressure on prices than does therapeutic
competition. R is a vector of indicators for regulatory regime.
Because RPs are based on lagged manufacturer supply prices, RPs
are expected to reflect the same product and market characteristics that
affect prices. Surcharges are defined as the difference between the price
and the RP; hence, the surcharge equations test for significant differ-
ences in coefficients between the RP and price equations.23 We use the
same specification but estimate separate equations for each country.
This approach permits all coefficients to vary across countries and facil-
itates comparison of coefficients across countries. One exception is that
the Parallel Import indicator is omitted from the New Zealand
equations because there are no parallel imports in New Zealand.
Product Characteristics.Pharmaceutical prices are expected to
depend on the value of the product to consumers and the extent of
competition. We include several measures of product efficacy. A quad-
ratic in Global molecule age (log), defined as months from the mole-
cule's first launch in any of our sample countries, is included as a
general proxy for product efficacy. Newer compounds are expected to
have higher prices, assuming that they are clinically superior on aver-
age to older molecules. A dummy variable controls for herbal products
and molecules that were launched before 1950, for which the IMS age
data are imprecise. Strength, defined as grams of active ingredient per
unit, is included as a proxy for product potency. The coefficient is
expected to be positive, assuming that a stronger dose of a given
compound has greater expected efficacy. Indicator variables are
included for Retard, Liquid, and Transdermal formulations; regular
tablets and capsules is the omitted category. Retard forms are expected
to have higher prices, assuming that delayed release forms offer greater32 Danzon and Ketcham
convenience to patients. Pack size (units per pack) is expected to be
negatively related to price if economies of scale in packaging are
passed on to consumers.
An Originator product indicator is included to test for brand loyalty.
The coefficient is expected to be positive in the price equation but not
in the subsidy equation if brand loyalty persists among physicians
and/or patients, but RP systems do not reflect these differences. An
indicator variable is included for parallel imports (PIs); the coefficient
is expected to be negative in the price and subsidy equations if the sav-
ings from PIs is captured by payers. Measurement of this effect may be
confounded, however, by nonrandom entry of PIs, that is, if products
that attract PIs are disproportionately high-priced products. For exam-
ple, omeprazole (Prilosec), which is priced well above average in
Germany, has nine parallel import products, whereas most compounds
have none; in the Netherlands, omeprazole has five parallel imports.
Indicator variables for three-digit Anatomical therapeutic classes
(ATCs) are included to control for unmeasured differences in average
product value by therapeutic category. The ACE inhibitors and
angiotensin-Il antagonists (C09) are omitted as the reference group.
Competition. We include three measures of competition: Generic
Competitors measures the number of manufacturers in the molecule;
Molecules in the three-digit ATC is a measure of therapeutic substitute
compounds; and Products of other molecules in the four-digit ATC is a
measure of the intensity of competition within the therapeutic substi-
tute molecules. In Germany, RPs and prices are expected to be nega-
tively related to the number of generic and therapeutic competitors
because RP levels were initially set lower in classes with more com-
petitors and because Germany's drug budgets made physicians price-
sensitive, thus creating incentives for price competition that enabled
subsequent downward revisions of RPs.
In the Netherlands, RPs are expected to be inversely related to the
number of competitors only to the extent that the 1991 price structure
on which they were based reflected competition. For prices, the Dutch
RP system did not encourage competition in list prices; hence, prices
are expected to be related to the number of competitors only to the
extent that this was imported through the maximum price caps. In
New Zealand, RPs are expected to be inversely related to the number
of generic and therapeutic competitors because of Pharmac's require-
ment that new entrants to a class give a price cut relative to the existingReference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 33
RE The estimated relationship may be biased by reverse causation,
however, if manufacturers were more likely to introduce products to
classes with higher RPs. In all three countries, the kinkeddemand
model predicts greater price competition at prices above the RP than
below the RP. Because we lack the data to identify these ranges sepa-
rately, the estimates in table 1.4 reflect the average effects over the full
range of prices.
Regulatory variables.Our tests for differential regulatory effects
focus on the year of launch of the molecule in each country because
launch prices establish the base from which prices adjust over time,
with price increases rarely permitted in regulated markets. We use
molecule rather than product launch date because generic and other
later entrants in an established molecule are constrained by the price
and reimbursement of the originator product in the moleculeunder
both RP and competitive regimes. We include variablesindicating
molecules launched in the country from 1987 to 1990, from 1991 to
1994, and after 1994. The last two categories roughlyidentify com-
pounds launched under RP; their coefficients are expected to be neg-
ative if RP systems are biased against new products. Theomitted
category is products launched before 1987and hence before RE
These older compounds are likely to be off-patent by 1998, butthe
effect of generic entry should be captured by our measureof generic
competitors 24
In all regressions we include an indicator for products that are not
reference-priced (Not-RP). Because these products are not randomly
chosen but are mostly new products or products that could not be clus-
tered, this variable does not identify the effects of reference pricing. For
Germany, where products outside the RP system were usuallyfully
reimbursed, the coefficient of the Not-RP indicator is expected to be
positive in the subsidy equation if RP lowers reimbursementlevels on
average. The surcharge for these observations is zeroby definition. For
New Zealand, non-RP molecules typically are not reimbursed, sothe
coefficient of the Not-RIP indicator is expected to be negative in the sub-
sidy equation, positive in the surcharge equation. For theNetherlands,
some non-RIP products are reimbursed;others are not.25
Empirical Results.Table 1.4 reports estimates of the price, subsidy,
and surcharge regressions, with the pack as the unit of observation.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































836 Danzon and Ketcham
and are not reported here. Table 1.4 reports t statistics based on robust
standard errors and adjusted for clustering across packs within a
product.
The quadratic in Global Molecule Age (a proxy for product efficacy)
implies that price and subsidy initially increase and then decrease with
molecule age. These effects are significant for price, subsidy, and sur-
charge in Germany and the Netherlands, but only for price in New
Zealand. The estimates imply that price and subsidy are highest for
molecules launched within the most recent two years and then decline
for older molecules, as expected under the hypothesis that older prod-
ucts are generally perceived to be less effective and thus are sold at
lower prices and receive lower subsidies. (Note that these estimates
control for the number of competitors, which increases with molecule
age and is a control for patent status.) In Germany and the Netherlands,
surcharges are also significantly higher for newer products, reaching a
maximum for two-year-old products in Germany and seven-year-old
products in the Netherlands. This implies that RP offers lower subsidy
differentials for new products than the price differentials that are
supported by the market.
The regulatory variables imply that, after controlling for Global
Molecule Age and Number of Competitors, in all three countries RP sub-
sidies for new compounds were similar to the subsidies for compounds
launched prior to 1987 (which were presumably mostly off-patent by
1998). By contrast, subsidies for compounds launched from 1987 to 1990,
that is, compounds that were probably still on-patent in 1998 but
launched prior to RI?, received higher subsidies. In the Netherlands, mol-
ecules launched after 1991, i.e., under the RI? system, received lower sub-
sidies than did molecules launched before 1987, with most negative
effects for the most recent, post-1994 compounds. The pattern is similar
in Germany, although significance levels are lower. Specifically, in
Germany, the post-1991 compounds have subsidies comparable to pre-
1987 compounds, whereas the compounds launched from 1987 to 1990,
which would primarily be compounds that were launched before the RI?
system but that are still on-patent in 1998, receive the highest subsidies.
Similarly, in New Zealand, the more recent compounds launched under
RI? have subsidies similar to the pre-1987 compounds, whereas com-
pounds that were launched from 1987 to 1990, before the adoption of
reference pricing, have higher subsidies, prices, and surcharges.
In Germany the newest, post-1994 molecules have the highest sur-
charges, whereas surcharges are not related to regulatory regime in theReference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 37
Netherlands, presumably because of the price controls. In New
Zealand, prices, surcharges, and subsidies are highest for compounds
launched prior to RE
Originator products do not receive higher subsidies than do generics
in Germany, consistent with the intent of generic referencing, and in
New Zealand originator products receive 16 percent lower subsidies. In
the Netherlands, originators receive roughly 21 percent higher subsidies
than generics. Because these coefficient estimates reflect both between-
molecule and within-molecule differences, even the Netherlands' esti-
mate of a small positive differential is not necessarily inconsistent with
the expectation that RP eliminates subsidy differentials for originator
versions of a given pack, compared to generic versions of that same
pack, as predicted under generic referencing. By contrast, originator
price differentials over generics are significant in Germany (31 percent
originator price differential) and the Netherlands (19 percent originator
differential). Out-of-pocket surcharges are significantly higher on origi-
nator products in Germany and also New Zealand, where they are small
in magnitude on average. In the Netherlands, the originator surcharge
differential is insignificant, possibly because of the maximum price
constraints.
In Germany, parallel imports do not receive significantly different
subsidies but they do charge higher prices and have positive sur-
charges. In fact, the similarity between the PT coefficient (.285) and the
originator coefficient (.307) suggests that, in Germany, PIs simply
shadow-price the originator products, yielding little savings to payers
or patients, which is additional evidence of weak incentives for price
competition under Germany's RI? system. Not surprisingly, the PT mar-
ket share was small in Germany. In the Netherlands, the PT coefficient
is similar to the originator coefficient for subsidies but smaller for price;
thus, the PT surcharge is negative but small in magnitude. Taken at face
value, these results indicate little savings to payers from PIs. These con-
clusions are tentative because the PT coefficients may be upward biased
if PIs are more likely to enter for high-priced products.
The evidence on competition is generally consistent with the kinked
demand model, as adapted to fit each country's RP system. The num-
ber of Generic Competitors is negatively related to both subsidies and
prices in both Germany and New Zealand. In Germany, the estimates
imply that each additional competitor leads to only a 1 percent reduc-
tion in subsidy or price. This small marginal effect of additional gener-
ics is consistent with weak incentives for generic competition under RP38 Danzon and Ketcham
in Germany. It is also not surprising because most generics in Germany
are branded; hence, they compete on brand image and reputation,
which contrasts with unbranded generics that predominate in the
United States and compete predominantly on price. In New Zealand,
the marginal effect of an additional generic competitor is 27 percent for
subsidy and 15 percent for price. These effects presumably reflect the
requirement that new generic entrants offer a reduction in price and RP
as a condition of reimbursement. In the Netherlands, the number of
generic competitors has a significant but small (1.6 percent) effect on
subsidy but no significant effect on price, which is expected given the
lack of incentives to compete on list price. The number of products in
substitute molecules has an economically small negative effect on sub-
sidies in Germany and on surcharges in the Netherlands, but a larger
and more significant negative effect in New Zealand, with a more neg-
ative effect for subsidy than for price, again possibly because of the reg-
ulatory requirement that new entrants accept lower prices and hence
reduce the RPs for the entire class. Thus, the evidence on the effects of
generic competition under RP is consistent for intramolecular and
closely related generic competitors: by itself, RP does not encourage
generic competitors to compete on price. Downward price pressure
occurs only when this is enforced through regulation, as in New
Zealand, or where other institutional factors outside the RP system cre-
ate incentives for price competition, such as drug budgets in Germany
or off-list discounting to pharmacists in the Netherlands.
Similarly, there is no evidence of price competition from therapeutic
substitutes in any of the three countries. On the contrary, in New
Zealand subsidy levels are significantly positively related to the num-
ber of molecules in the ATC3. These estimates may reflect endogeneity
bias if new compounds enter the New Zealand market only if they can
obtain a relatively high subsidy level, as shown in table 1.3.
Other product characteristics included in the estimating equations
but not reported here generally have the expected signs. Subsidy and
price are generally positively related to strength (grams of active
ingredient) per dose and negatively related to pack size. Retard forms
have significantly higher subsidies and prices than regular tablets (the
omitted category), with similar magnitudes in all three countries. This
finding suggests that manufacturers apply standard markups for these
more costly forms. For transdermal forms, Germany has significantly
higher subsidies, whereas New Zealand's subsidies do not differentiate
between transdermal and standard oral forms. Products that are notReference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 39
reference-priced are generally not reimbursed in New Zealand, which
is reflected in a large negative coefficient on the Not-RP indicator in the
subsidy equation. By contrast, in the price equation, the Not-RP indi-
cator is positive, indicating that these are relatively high-priced
products.
The subsidy coefficients for several of the therapeutic category indi-
cators are statistically significant, relative to the omitted category (ACE
inhibitors), but coefficient magnitudes and even signs differ across
countries. This tends to confirm the earlier evidence of a lack of con-
sistent evaluation across countries of the relative merits of different
products and/or that budget imperatives override clinical judgments.
VI.Conclusions on Effects of RP on Availability, Subsidies, and
Prices
This evidence on the impact of reference pricing is broadly consistent
with predictions given the differences in system design across our
three countries. We find that New Zealand's RP system (which is
most comprehensive, has the broadest classes, and uses monopsony
power to obtain price reductions) is associated with significantly
reduced availability of new products, particularly for more expen-
sive compounds. Availability is also somewhat reduced in the
Netherlands.
In all three countries, subsidies for molecules launched in the post-
RP period are comparable to subsidies for (mostly off-patent) com-
pounds launched before 1987 and are lower than subsidies for (mostly
on-patent) compounds launched in the 1987-1990 period immediately
prior to RID. These estimates control for cohort therapeutic effects and
the number of competitors. Compared to older compounds, surcharges
for the more recent drugs are positive in Germany, implying some will-
ingness of consumers to pay more for newer products than was
reflected in subsidy levels. Surcharges are negative in the Netherlands,
but because both prices and RPs were set by regulation, this provides
no evidence of market willingness to pay. In New Zealand, surcharges
do not appear to be differentially higher on new products, but these
conclusions are tentative because of small numbers.
Although a major objective of RP systems is to stimulate competi-
tion, there is no evidence of competition among therapeutic substitutes
in any of the three countries. Although both subsidies and prices are
inversely related to the number of generic competitors, magnitudes are40 Danzon and Ketcham
small in both the Netherlands and Germany and may reflect other fac-
tors: physician drug budgets in Germany and, in the Netherlands,
influences imported from the pre-RP era or from other countries
through external referencing. In New Zealand, subsidies and, to a
lesser extent, price are significantly negatively related to the number of
generic competitors, but this finding reflects the regulatory require-
ment of price cuts from new entrants. This failure of generic referenc-
ing to stimulate competition in these three countries reflects the details
of their system design: in particular, the regulation of pharmacy mar-
gins and weak incentives for pharmacists to substitute cheaper prod-
ucts. The exception is the Netherlands, where competition did occur
but is not observable in these data on list prices because it took the
form of discounts off list price, which yielded savings to pharmacies,
not to payers, until the discounts were clawed back. An important con-
clusion is that the effects of RP in any country will depend critically on
the structure of pharmacy incentives to substitute cheaper products.
We discuss this further below when we consider the effects of adopting
PP in the United States.
The evidence from regression analysis, that therapeutic referencing
has not stimulated dynamic competition, is consistent with the kinked
demand model of manufacturer response to PP. This conclusion is also
supported by other circumstantial evidence, that all three countries
found it necessary to adopt additional measures to control prices. In
particular, the Netherlands adopted maximum prices based on foreign
prices because their internal RP system had not stimulated dynamic
competition as intended, and the resulting regulated prices made the
RPs irrelevant for many products. In 2001, Germany mandated that
pharmacies increase substitution of PIs and cheaper generics where
available. Thus, Germany's PP system alone did not stimulate signifi-
cant generic competition, which is not surprising because it gave no
incentive to pharmacists to substitute cheaper products. New Zealand
has used additional measuresrequiring a price cut from new
entrants and tenderingto enforce dynamic price competition. This
has achieved lower prices, particularly on relatively expensive new
compounds, but at the cost of reduced availability of these new com-
pounds. In conclusion, both theory and empirical evidence support the
conclusion that reference pricing, as structured in these three countries,
did not deliver its main intended benefit of stimulating competition
between substitute products except when it was implemented with
aggressive monopsony power, as in New Zealand.Reference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 41
VII.Reference Pricing as Efficient Insurance Benefit Design
Standard models of optimal insurance coverage focus on the trade-off
between risk spreading and cost control in the context of moral hazard;
medical services are usually implicitly assumed to be competitively
supplied at prices equal to marginal cost. While the risk-spreading ver-
sus cost-control trade-off is also relevant to pharmaceutical benefit
design, the optimal insurance structure for drugs must also consider
the effects of reimbursement on drug prices and hence on manufactur-
ers' incentives for innovation and provider/patient incentives for sub-
stitution between products. A formal model of optimal drug coverage
is beyond the scope of this paper. In this section, we draw on existing
models to suggest conclusions about the efficiency and equity of RP
compared to alternatives such as a proportional co-insurance rate or a
formulary with tiered copayments.
Standard models of optimal insurance conclude that, in an ideal
world where the insurer has perfect information about the patient's
condition and the appropriate treatment, the insurance payment
would be an indemnity payment equal to the cost of treatment, and
moral hazard would not exist. More realistically, when the insurer can-
not observe the patient's condition and therefore treatment is deter-
mined by the physician/patient team subject to moral hazard, optimal
insurance coverage (assuming reliance on demand management)
involves a trade-off between risk spreading and lower premium
payments (Pauly 1968, Zeckhauser 1970, Ma and Riordan 2002).
Specifically, the optimal patient cost share for different conditions is
greater, when the demand for treatment is more price elastic (Ma and
Riordan 2002).
Applying this result to the RP context of patient heterogeneity in
their response to different drugs, the optimal patient copayment sched-
ule is likely to require some cost sharing between the patient and the
insurer for the incremental cost of more expensive drugs, with the
patient paying a larger share of the incremental cost as demand
becomes more price elastic. RIP pays an indemnity equal to the cheap-
est drug in a class, with 100 percent patient cost sharing for the
incremental cost of more expensive drugs. Generic referencing is con-
sistent with optimal insurance coverage for generically equivalent com-
pounds because these products are required by regulation to be
bioequivalent. Thus, differential patient response is generally not an
issue. For therapeutic substitutes that differ in their effects for different42 Danzon and Ketcham
patients, however, RP is unlikely to provide the optimal trade-off
between risk spreading and cost control for patients who do not
respond to the cheaper drug. RP is likely to be inferior to a co-insurance
rate, which would provide some risk protection for the incremental cost
of more expensive drugs for these patients. RP is also likely to be infe-
rior to a tiered formulary, which would typically include several drugs
on the preferred tier, even if they are priced differently, if patients are
heterogeneous in their response to the different compounds in a class.
Similarly, from the perspective of equity, if patients differ in their
response to drugs due to genetics, comorbidities, or other factors, and
if the objective is to use public funds to ensure that everyone has a uni-
form basic level of care, then equity requires higher subsidies to
higher-priced drugs if these are needed by some patients to achieve
the target care level. If all drugs in a class are reimbursed at the price
of the cheapest or most widely tolerated drug in the class, patients
with comorbidities and those taking several other drugswho may
also be the sickest patientsmay be most likely to face surcharges to
obtain a drug that they can tolerate. By analogy, defined contribution
insurance plans would pay risk-adjusted subsidies to sicker patients
to enable them to buy the same basic care that healthy patients can
buy with lower subsidies. By fully subsidizing only the cheapest prod-
uct in a class, RP systems fail to risk-adjust the subsidy rate and thus
do not enable patients for whom the cheapest drug is ineffective to
achieve the same outcomes as other patients for whom the cheapest
drug is effective.
Optimal insurance coverage for drugs should also take into account
the effects of the subsidy structure on prices to suppliers and hence on
incentives for innovation. Assume that the term and structure of
patents are optimally set and that the price differential between on-
patent and generic drugs is optimal before insurance. If insurance with
therapeutic RI? is introduced with a classification system that ignores
patents, it effectively gives a full subsidy to generics but a zero subsidy
to the patent-induced price differentials of on-patent drugs. This raises
the relative out-of-pocket price of on-patent drugs faced by patients.
This may lead manufacturers of on-patent drugs to reduce their prices
if demand is highly elastic above the RP. But in any case, revenues of
on-patent products will decline relative to revenues for generics, and
incentives for innovation are reduced, particularly for drugs that offer
improved treatments within existing categories, which are most likely
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rate or a tiered formulary would imply some insurance coverageof the
on-patent price differential.
In practice, the optimal insurance share of the price differential
between on-patent drugs and old generics depends on the incremental
value of the innovation and on whether the patent structure is in fact
optimal. Whether current patent protection is excessive, suboptimal, or
just right cannot be determined a priori. But if the current rate of inno-
vation is considered about right, then therapeutic RF which reduces
effective patent life for all but the first entrant in a new class, would
reduce incentives for R&D to develop improved therapies within exist-
ing classes and result in suboptimal innovation compared to the status
quo mix of proportional co-insuranceand tiered copayment struc-
tures.26 This conclusion still holds if both the generic and the on-patent
drug are subject to a fixed copayment. This interaction between insur-
ance coverage and incentives for innovation isanother reason why the
defined contribution approach to subsidizing insurance breaks down
when applied to drugs. Insurance plans do not incur large fixed costs
of R&D and rarely generate patentable innovations. Thus, patents are
not relevant to the design of optimal subsidies for insurance coverage.
By contrast, given the large fixed costs of R&D (both absolutely and as
a percentage of total costs) and the importanceof patents for innovator
drugs, the optimal subsidy structure for pharmaceuticals cannot ignore
the effects on incentives for innovation.
If RPs have a significant influence over manufacturer prices, as the
theory and evidence above suggest, then RPs can influence price sig-
nals and hence efficiency of resource use. In particular, because the HP
for different products is not necessarily differentiated based on their
relative effectiveness, RP can distort prescribing choices. Appropriate
incentives for resource use and for innovation require that compounds
that are less effective or that require a longer course of treatment to
achieve a given outcome should be reimbursed less per daily dose
than more effective drugs or drugs that require fewer days or doses to
achieve the same outcome. In practice, cost-effectiveness criteria are
not used rigorously to set RPs. Typically, the RP applies tothe daily
dose of each drug in a class, regardless of differences in effects or
required duration of treatment. By contrast, both a proportional co-
insurance and a tiered copayment structure can easily tailor differ-
ences in reimbursement to reflect differences inefficacy. For example,
a higher-priced but more effective drugcould be on the preferred tier
of a PBM formulary and receive a higher reimbursement than a44 Danzon and Ketcham
cheaper but less cost-effective, inferior drug. We don't suggest that
PBMs consider only cost-effectiveness and not budget costs in design-
ing their formularies. The point is simply that the tiered formulary
structure can easily reimburse different drugs in proportion to their
differing effectiveness, and this sends appropriate signals for prescrib-
ing choices and for R&D. By contrast, RP systems tend to set equal
reimbursement rates per daily dose for different drugs, regardless of
differences in efficacy, which sends distorted signals for prescrib-
ing and for R&D.
VIII.Implications for the United States
Reference pricing has been proposed for a Medicare drug benefit in the
United States under the assumption that this benefit would be deliv-
ered by a single monopoly PBM in each geographicarea (Huskamp
et al. 2000, and more generally, Kanavos and Reinhardt 2003). If RP is
simply an option that can be used by competing PBMs, then theuse of
monopsony power would be more limited and competitive forces
would contrain its use to classes where drugs are highly interchange-
able for most people. In fact, the limited evidence from private-sector
PBM experience with RP suggests that the classes for which therewas
sufficient clinical consensus to adopt RP accounted for only roughly 30
percent of total ingredient cost. Despite a roughly 25 percent shifting
from nonpreferred to preferred agents, estimated savings to the plan
were only 1 percent of total drug spending (Sanders 2001).
RP would potentially play a larger role if PBMs are constrained from
using tiered or otherwise restrictive formularies, which is likely if each
area is served by only one PBM to avoid problems of risk selection.
Huskamp et al. (2000) propose that PBMs periodically compete for the
franchise in a particular area, but the successful bidder in eacharea
would serve the entire area. In that case, seniors would haveno choice
of PBM, so the single monopoly PBM would probably be required to
offer all drugs on an open formulary with a standard co-insuranceor
copayment rate, rather than on a tiered formulary typically offered by
PBMs in the private sector. Such restrictions would eliminate the abil-
ity of PBMs to negotiate discounts from manufacturers in return for
preferred formulary status, which would deprive them of their major
tool for controlling drug prices. As an alternative, Huskamp et al.
(2000) propose reference pricing. RP could also resultas the drug prod-
uct analogy of an "any willing provider" requirement that has beenReference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 45
proposed for the participation of pharmacies in a Medicare drug
benefit.
Although none of these proposals provide a detailed outline of how
RP might work for Medicare, to achieve significant savings, it would
have to include on-patent products, presumably with off-patent prod-
ucts, and exclude only first-in-class new products, asin the
Netherlands and New Zealand. It would also presumably be a single
national system. What does experience from these countries and from
the U.S. system of RP for off-patent medicines tell us about how such a
system might work in practice?
First, it is critical to distinguish between drugs in classes with only
on-patent originator drugs versus classes that include generic versions
of off-patent drugs. Presumably most new classes would start off as on-
patent-only but would become mixed (on- and off-patent drugs) over
time. For the on-patent-only classes, if the RP is set at the lowest price
in the class, other prices would likely drop to the RP except that some
surcharges might remain for clearly differentiated products. There
would be little incentive for dynamic price competition below the ini-
tial RP, however, unless the government agent used its monopsony
power to demand price cuts from new entrants, as inNew Zealand.27
Competitive bidding would probably not be an effective strategy
unless winning bidders get some preferential placement on the formu-
lary, which is precluded by the assumption of an open, nontiered for-
mulary. With an open, nontiered formulary, each firm has little
incentive to bid a low price ex ante because this would just increase the
probability that the RP is low without increasing that firm's expected
market share (because other competitors could reduce the prices to the
RP once it had been set). Thus, an open formulary requirement elimi-
nates a payer's ability to negotiate discounts. One possible outcome is
that the Medicare RP system might take competitive bids and, follow-
ing the lead of many state Medicaid programs, adopt priorauthoriza-
tion requirements for drugs that do not match the lowest bid price. This
is a restrictive formulary in all but name. If firms still failed to bid low
under this approach, the Medicare RP system might simply require
that all firms give a specified discount off their private-sector prices or
face prior authorization requirements, which is the approach adopted
by many state Medicaid programs. This approach would achieve lower
prices but through the exercise of monopsony power, not through com-
petitive forces operating under the RP system as envisaged by propo-
nents of the RP approach. Thus, unless an RP system exploits its46 Danzon and Ketcham
monopsony power, it would be less effective at achieving competitive
controls on prices than would PBMs that use tiered formularies
because the tiered formularies enable the PBM to negotiate competitive
discounts in return for moderate increases in market share. This con-
clusion that RP without either monopsony power or some formulary
restrictions would be ineffective at controlling prices of on-patent
drugs is limited, however, to classes with on-patent products only.
For mixed classes that include both on-patent molecules and off-
patent molecules with generic products, the effect of RP on prices of the
on-patent products could be dramatic, assuming that pharmacy incen-
tives remain the same as under current maximum allowable charge
(MAC) programs. Here, the experience of other countries with RPsys-
tems is misleading because their structure has been far less successful
at stimulating generic competition than has the U.S. approach to
generic referencing. Three factors contribute to greater generic compe-
tition under U.S. MAC programs than under RP in the countries stud-
ied. First, the default rule in the United States is that pharmacistscan
substitute a generic for a brand unless the physician expressly writes
"brand required." Second, U.S. pharmacists have incentives to substi-
tute the cheapest generic available because they capture the difference
between the MAC reimbursement and the drug acquisition cost,
whereas pharmacists in countries with regulated margins typically
earn less if they dispense a lower-priced product. U.S. pharmacists'
ability to profit from dispensing cheaper generics makes their demand
highly price-elastic, which in turn gives generic manufacturersan
incentive to compete on price. Third, payers in the United States cap-
ture much of the savings from generic competition by periodically
reducing the MAC based on audits of actual acquisition prices.
Lowering the MAC triggers another round of generic price competition
as generic manufacturers seek to increase their market share by offering
larger margins in pharmacies. If a Medicare RP required that RPs be
fixed for a year, as proposed by Huskamp et al. (2000), more of thesav-
ings from generic competition would accrue to pharmacists rather than
to payers, as in the Netherlands, and generic prices and reimbursement
might decline somewhat less rapidly over time than they do currently
under the more flexible MAC systems used by competing PBMs.
Assuming that a Medicare RP system would be structured to mimic
roughly U.S. MAC programs for generics, this could havea devastat-
ing effect on revenues for on-patent products in the same class. For
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prices, then the reimbursement for on-patentproducts would fall by 80
percent once the first molecule in the class goesoff-patent. If an on-
patent drug in a mixed class maintained its price,patients would face
an out-of-pocket costequal to the brandgeneric price differential,
which would likely be significantly higher thansurcharges faced by
patients in other RIP countries and significantlyhigher than the differ-
ential surcharge on nonpreferred drugs undertiered formularies.28
Many patients would presumably ask theirphysicians to switch them
to the off-patent generic; others mightask their physicians to seek a
special exemption from the surcharge, whichwould entail administra-
tive costs. If demand is sufficiently elastic,originator prices would
drop to the RIP. Because of either lower prices orvolumes or both, on-
patent originator products would experiencesignificant loss of rev-
enue and effective loss of patentprotection once the first drug in a class
went off-patent.
Thus if therapeutic RIP were combinedwith the more competitive
generic RIP system in the U.S., the negativeeffect on revenues of on-
patent drugs in mixed classes wouldlikely be greater than in the
Netherlands or New Zealand, where generic competitionis weaker.
Although in principle this effect of RIP would applyonly to the roughly
40 percent of sales accounted for by seniors, inpractice private payers
and Medicaid would likely demand similar prices tothose obtained by
Medicare. Thus, the reduction in revenueswould likely apply to the
entire U.S. market. Because the United States accountsfor over 50 per-
cent of global pharmaceutical revenuesand a larger share of profits, the
effect on incentives for R&D could thus besignificant. This significant
effect of RP in mixed classes does not depend on aMedicare RP system
exploiting its monopsony power. It resultssolely from classifying on-
patent drugs with off-patent drugs in the U.S. context,in which there
is aggressive generic competition as aresult of the incentive structure
for pharmacists.
The effect of RIP in the United States on theavailability of new prod-
ucts will also be very different from othercountries' experiences. Given
the dominant U.S. share of the global market, it seemslikely that man-
ufacturers would rationally choose to launch newdrugs because the
foregone sales from not launching would befar higher than in a small
market such as New Zealand. Thus, RIP appliedin the United States
would probably not affect the availability of new drugsthat are already
far along in the development process (for which mostfixed costs are
already sunk). By contrast, the long-term effectof RIP in the United48 Darizon and Ketcham
States on the number of new drugs developed would befar greater
than in other countries. A significant reduction inexpected revenues in
the U.S. market would significantly reduceexpected global revenues
and hence reduce incentives for companiesto develop new drugs.
These effects might not be evident for at least 5to 10 years, assuming
that the main R&D cuts wouldoccur for drugs still at the preclinical or
phase 1 stage, (for which significant investmentsmust still be made).
The evidence from other countries cannot informanalysis of these
effects given the much larger U.S. share of globalsales. If a New
Zealandstyle approach to obtaining price cutswere applied to on-
patent classes, in addition to classifying on-patent withoff-patent
products, the reduction in expected returnsto R&D and hence in
incentives for new R&D investment could bevery large.
Appendix 1.1:Internal Reference Pricing, External Referencing,
Price Regulation, and Formularies
Internal Reference Pricing
Internal referencing pricing systems seta common reimbursement
level for different products ina designated group, with the reference
price usually based on some low price in the distributionof manufac-
turer prices for the group of drugs. Thus, internal referencepricing
compares prices across different products within a given country; its
goal is to encourage price competitionamong manufacturers, but
prices are not regulated.
External Referencing
External referencing refers to systems that limit theprice and reim-
bursement of a specific product inone country by referring to the price
of that same product in another country. This approachlimits the man-
ufacturer's ability to price-discriminateacross countries for a given
product but does not directly seek to promotecompetition between
products. External referencing is used inmany countries, including
Italy, Canada, Belgium, Spain, and the Netherlandsthe latter also uses
internal referencing.29
Price Regulation
In pure price regulatory systems suchas those in France or Italy, the max-
imum reimbursable price is also the maximum that themanufacturer can
charge. This regulated price may be basedon external referencing toReference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 49
foreign prices for the same drug or prices of similar products onthe mar-
ket. Although this latter approach resembles internal RPsuperficially, it
differs in several important respects. First, the new drug mayreceive a
higher reimbursement price if it can show significanttherapeutic advan-
tage over existing products. Second, thecross-product comparisons usu-
ally apply only to setting the launch price of the newdrug; post-launch
prices are not systematically reviewed and revisedwhen a new prod-
uct enters the class. Third, in pure price regulatoryschemes, the manufac-
hirer is not permitted to charge more thanthe regulated price.
Formularies
Tiered formularies used by pharmacy benefit managers(PBMs) in the
United States categorize compounds by therapeutic category.Within each
therapeutic category, however, the reimbursement paid tomanufacturers
and the copayments charged to patients can differ based on costeffec-
tiveness and other factors that the PBM uses toclassify products as
generics, preferred brands, and nonpreferred brands.Corresponding
copayment rates are, say, $5 for a generic, $15 for apreferred brand, and
$30 for a nonpreferred brand. Because PBMs can shiftutilization toward
preferred products, they can negotiate discounts frommanufacturers in
return for granting preferred status to their products.Thus, unlike RP, in
a tiered formulary differentcompounds within a therapeutic category are
commonly reimbursed at different rates. For example, ifdrug A is more
effective than drug B in the same class, drug A can bereimbursed at a
higher price and still be on the preferred tier, providedthat it is equally or
more cost-effective than drugB at the higher price. The reimbursement
for on-patent products in a class does not immediatelyfall to generic lev-
els when the patent expires on one molecule in the class.If, say, com-
pound B is off-patent and has generic competitors,the PBM may
encourage generic substitution by payingonly for the generic version of
compound B or placing brand B in the nonpreferred tier with amuch
higher copayment. But brand A, which is still on-patent, maybe on the
preferred tier and receive a higher reimbursement than generic Bif brand
A offers some advantages over generic B. Patient copaymentdifferentials
are also more open-ended under RPthan in the tiered copay model.
Notes
This study was supported by a grant from Wyeth. We would like tothank IMS Health
for providing the data. The views expressed are those of theauthors.50 Danzon and Ketcham
IMS Health (IMS) is a global market research company based in Plymouth
Meeting, Pa.
For more detail on Germany, see Ulrich and Wifie (1996); for the Netherlands,see
Rigter (1994) and de Vos (1996); for New Zealand, see Kletchko, Moore, and Jones (1995)
and Woodfield (2001); for analysis of reference pricing in general,see Lopez-Casasnovas
and Puig-Junoy (2001), Jonsson (2001), and Danzon (2001).
In 1999, the pharmaceutical industry challenged the right of the BKK toset RP levels
as a violation of German and European Union (EU) competition law. In 2001, the federal
government assumed these functions.
Most generics in Germany are branded, and physicians frequently prescribe thespe-
cific brand of generic. By contrast, in the United States, genericsare not branded; the
pharmacist is authorized to substitute unless the physician requires the brand;and
because U.S. pharmacists can profit from the margin between the reimbursementand the
acquisition cost, pharmacists have strong financial incentives to substitute cheap
generics, which in turn creates incentives for generic manufacturers tocompete on price.
From 1989 to 1993, products under RP were exempt from the DM3copayment that
applied to non-RP drugs. In 1993, all drugs were subject toa DM3/5/7 copayment
structure initially based on the price, later on the pack size.
An incentive for manufacturers to price below the RP could exist if physiciansare
imperfectly informed about the RP and therefore tend to choose the cheapestproducts to
reduce the risk of a patient surcharge and, in Germany, to avoid the obligationto explain
the need for a surcharged product.
The five criteria were (1) same mechanism of action; (2) used for thesame indication,
based on actual use, not the official product labeling; (3) similarroute of administration
(for example, parenteral forms are grouped separately from oral forms ofthe same com-
pound); (4) intended for the same age group; and (5) no significant differences inclinical
effects, desirable or undesirable, for all patients. This broadened the earlierdefinition,
which permitted a separate class if the clinical differences affected onlysome patients.
To inform patients, some pharmacists reportedly simply posta notice advising that
substitution will occur unless the patient requests otherwise.
The average is an (unweighted) average priceper day at the ex-wholesaler level,
using the package size with the lowest unit cost in each country, including alloriginator
and generic products (excluding parallel imports).
A full analysis of the effects of RP on manufacturers would include the probability
that a compound is launched; the probability that a product is reference-pricedand the
determination of RP level; the manufacturer's price response and patientsurcharge, con-
ditional on RP; unit sales volume and market shares; and dynamicevolution of RPs,
prices, and quantities over time.
Parallel trade refers to arbitrage shipments by a third party (usuallya wholesaler)
taking advantage of differences in prices charged by the originatormanufacturer for the
same product sold in different countries. Such parallel trade has been explicitly author-
ized within the European Union (EU) for trade between EU countriesbut not from out-
side the EU. In the United States, parallel trade is precluded by traditionalpatent law.
However, current proposals before Congress would permit importationinto the United
States of drugs produced in a Food and Drug Administration (FDA)approved facffity in
Canada or several other countries.Reference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare 51
Manufacturers might achieve a relatively high price in the Netherlands by launching
new products first in the unregulated U.K. and German markets, delaying launch in the
more tightly regulated markets of France and Belgium. Because the Dutch price ceilings
apply throughout the life of the product, they would likely be more binding for older
compounds, particularly those with generics available in the benchmark countries.
A formal model of the effects of RP and drug budgets is developed in Danzon and
Liu (1996).
These spifiovers apply only to originator products because generics are generally not
subject to cross-national price regulation and are rarely parallel traded.
Our data from 1998 predate the 1999 downward revision of RP levels based on these
capped prices. Following this revision, RPs may be a binding constraint for more
products, leading to more clustering at the RP than we observed in our 1998 data.
We use the IMS therapeutic classification system, which is similar to the World
Health Organization's anatomical therapeutic classification (ATC) system.
IMS defines a standard unit as a proxy for a dose for each formulation. For oral
forms, a standard unit is one tablet or one capsule; for liquids, it is 5 milliliters, etc. Our
dollar price estimates use the average exchange rates, implied by the IMS data, of
DM.554$1, NLG.492 = $1, and $NZ.557 = $1.
Cox proportional hazard model estimates show that the launch hazard for a new
compound in New Zealand compared to Germany became significantly lower after 1994
(Danzon and Ketcham 2004 forthcoming).
Two additional molecules, sotalol and fenofibrate, were approved in the United
States during this time period but were in at least one of the three other countries prior
to 1980, so they were excluded from the analysis in table 1.2.
The price (RP) relative for each molecule is defined as the ratio of the weighted aver-
age price (RP) for the molecule in the comparison country (the Netherlands or New
Zealand) relative to that molecule's price (Ri') in Germany.
The same pattern occurs if molecules are categorized by their global launch date
rather than by country-specific launch date.
In table 1.4, the RP for each molecule is the volume-weighted average of the pack-
level RP per standard unit for all packs in the molecule in each country. The analysis
is based on matching molecules, but formulations may differ across countries. The
estimates may be biased for the unconditional effects of Ri' if, for example, more
expensive formulations are less likely to be launched in New Zealand for reasons
other than Ri'.
The surcharge coefficients are not exactly the difference between the price and
RP coefficients because we use the log transformation of price and Ri', which are
approximately log normal, whereas surcharge is in dollar units because it can be
negative.
While our proxy for molecule efficacy is its Global age, the regime indicators are
based on the Country-specific age.
All equations include indicator variables to identify products for which there
was imputation of the subsidy because of imperfect matching of our price and subsidy
data sets.52 Danzon and Ketcham
RP requires the patient to pay 100 percent of the price differential of the new drug
compared to the older, cheaper drug, whereas under a fixed percentage co-insurance of,
say, 20 percent, the patient would pay only 20 percent of the price differential of the
newer drug. Under the typical PBM formulary structure, the patient pays a tiered
copayment, say, $5 for a generic, $15 for a preferred brand, and $30 for a nonpreferred
brand. Consider a class with three products: a generic, an originator product in molecule
A that is off-patent, and an originator product in molecule B that is on-patent. A typical
formulary would place off-patent originator A on the nonpreferred tier, and generic A
and originator B on the preferred tier. A patient who wants originator A must pay the full
originator price differential of brand A relative to generic A. For on-patent originator B,
however, the out-of-pocket price to the patient is only $15 and the PBM pays the manu-
facturer price minus the $15 and minus any discounts negotiated by the manufacturer to
get the preferred tier placement.
The evidence suggests that price competition among on-patent, therapeutic sub-
stitute products is fairly weak in the absence of management by a PBM, possibly
because unmanaged drug demand is dominated by physicians, who are not highly
price-sensitive. If the Medicare drug benefit uses the proposed 25 percent co-insurance
rate, this might induce more price sensitivity in patients and physician-agents and
hence more price competition. Still, it seems likely that using a tiered formulary, with
its leverage to negotiate discounts on on-patent drugs, would offer seniors a better
trade-off between out-of-pocket exposure and choice of drug than would an RP
system.
Brand-generic price differentials are significantly higher in the United States than in
most other countries because the United States has both relatively low generic prices and
relative high originator prices (Danzon and Furukawa 2003).
External referencing is discussed in Danzon (1997).
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